The Disaster at New Orleans Essay Example for Free

The Disaster at untested Orleans raiseThe urban center of New Orleans is one of the most culturally diverse urban centers in northernmost America. It was founded in southeastern Louisiana on the banks of the Mississippi River some 180 km away from the disconnectedness of Mexico. It was built in 1718 on the east bank of the river and south of Lake Pontchartrain. The metropolis was named for Philippe II, Duc dOrleans, the regent of France during the eon of Louis XV. It soon became one of the most active commercial port centers of the country. Its diverse culture later on sour it into an international tourist destination (Hass, 2006). Unfortunately, New Orleans was built on a shimmy of write down on the Mississippi Delta that ensures constant sinking of the land. This coup lead with rising seas presents a great danger to the city. Floods and combat surges are the most feared natural disasters that could occur. To continue this, Billions of dollars worth of levees, sea walls, pumping systems and satellite hurricane tracking have been adapt in place to allow for the nurtureion of the residents of New Orleans.However, it seems, the problem of New Orleans became even great(p) with these remedies (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2002). In 2002, New Orleans Times-Picayune released a fin-part report on what could possibly happen if a major hurricane reached the city. As the world would see in 2005, all the speculations and predictions of this report became painfully true. The situation back therefore up to 2005 grew completely worse. New Orleans was already 3 feet downstairs sea level a century ago. This means the effect of storms is amplified against the city.Furthermore, coastal erosion of barrier islands and destruction of the marshes present a big threat because hurricane winds and swamp could go inland undeterred. The city is surrounded by water and has areas that are below sea level. The levee system built to protect the city made the city a h uge cast ready to receive water that reaches past the levee but unable to drain it somewhere else. The levees likewise prevent the continued growth of the delta through silt build-up coming from up the river. Huge structures built on the strip of land contributed to the sinking of the land (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2002).Models way back in 2002 of the possible scenarios if a hurricane did hit the city were already grim at best. Most of the city would be underwater and the levee system that was built to protect New Orleans would be its own undoing. These pushed scientists to try to find ways to avert disaster. One proposed solving was to build a flood wall of up to 30 feet high bisecting New Orleans and Jefferson Parish to develop a community haven on the river side of the wall where they could retreat and excessively protect buildings from trespass of floodwaters from the lake.In 2002, government agencies and separate leaders supposedly mobilized themselves to try and addres s the rising risk from hurricane strikes. The federal emergency Management Agency prepared new responses to the flooding of the New Orleans bowl. Some of the findings were that the levees be raised and lost marshes and barrier islands be rebuilt but the efforts would have been worth at least $14 one million million (McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2002). In August of 2005, the feared category 5 hurricane finally came.Hurricane Katrina began as a category 1 hurricane in August 25 when it passed southern Florida. It moved west on August 26 to sequential to Louisiana. The warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico strengthened it turning it into a category 5 hurricane by too soon Sunday, August 28. The National Hurricane shopping center had predicted the second landfall for August 29. By then, around a million throng had already been evacuated from the restoreed areas of southeast Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin had already arranged mandatory evacuation of the city on August 28.However, 100,000 of the 469,000 citizens of New Orleans did not precede every because they were too poor or were too sure that they would not be affected by the imminent disaster (Drew, 2006). Katrina suddenly weakened to a category 3 storm just before qualification landfall and shifting a bit thus sparing New Orleans from the strongest winds. However, the disaster that had persistent been predicated came yet came to pass. Tidal surges of six to eight m or 20 to 25 ft came in from the disjunction and destroyed the 18-m or 11 mi long earthen levee system that protected St.Bernard Parish. The tide also surged further inland into the Industrial Canal destroying the concrete floodwalls and making large breaches that flooded one of the poorest neighborhoods, set down Ninth Ward, by up to four m or 12 ft of water. The strong winds also pushed water from Lake Pontchartrain back up the drainage canals north of the city. Although the city was spared from the worst do omsday scenario predicted, damage that had long been predicated came to pass (Drew, 2006). As New Orleans found out later, the worst was yet to come. after(prenominal) the storm, only eastern sections of the city were flooded and the most obvious damage was to the glass panels of high rise buildings and rips on the skin of the roof of the Louisiana Superdome which also was employ as the main evacuation center of the city. After the storm, floodwaters from Lake Pontchartrain poured through huge breaches in the walls of the 17th street and London Avenue drainage canals which were supposed to pay out rainwater from the city. These drainage canals, instead, brought more of the water into the dry center of the city (Drew, 2006).The wealthy and materialistic neighborhoods in the northern side of the city were flooded with the waters of Lake Pontchartrain by nightfall of August 29. Emergency communications that were supposed to be used for rescue and relief operations came down and loot ing became far-flung across the city. The Superdome, that lost power during the storm, was surrounded by flood waters, trapping 25,000 evacuees in a dank sweatbox reaching temperatures of up to 100oF or 38oC by morning of August 30.Although the flood waters did not affect the historical French Quarter of the city, by evening of August 30, the citys residential areas were deluge with 200,000 homes damaged 50,000 of which were severely damaged. The scenario developing was grim and terrible but much of it was predicted before the actual event. Corpses were pin down inside flooded homes but some floated out the water-filled streets. Thousands were stranded on the interstate, the only evacuation headway for New Orleans residents, without food or water (Drew, 2006).Perhaps the most frustrating part of the experience was that the decision-makers were apparently unable to handle the situation properly. As in all disasters, when city and state officials go bad outmatched and overwhelmed, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must step in to address the problems. It was obvious that disdain the early predictions given by scientists, the city did not have evacuation protocol for the 100,000 people who did not have cars and the preparation of the shelter that could hold the people for a day or two.The buses that could have been used for the evacuation should have been staged at the Superdome but were trapped in flooded garages. The police overstretch that was supposed to respond after the storm was trimmed to only 249 instead of 1,600 further delaying the rescue operations (Drew, 2006). The decision-making structure entangled the mayor of New Orleans, the governor of Louisiana and the head of FEMA and its ground commander. As was later seen, the structure was ineffective in delivering aid to the city and only resulted in bickering among the many officials.This led to more damage to life and property and made the situation even worse. The governor took two geezerhood to commandeer buses around the state to evacuate the city. FEMA did not even begin calling in other buses until two days after the storm. One third of the Louisiana National safe-conduct was apparently in Iraq and it was not until September 1 and 2 that help from the Guard troops from other states came. Though FEMA and the Guard provided food and water to trapped evacuees at the Superdome, the 20,000 people inside the New Orleans Convention Center were given very little aid (Drew, 2006).He flooded areas of the city became infested with molds and water became murky from fatty sludge and other chemicals. Months after the storm, only less than 100,000 people returned to New Orleans. Many did not leave the metropolitan areas of much safer cities where they decided to find new jobs and start new lives. All this made Hurricane Katrina the costliest natural disaster in American history and the third deadliest. The cost was estimated at around $125 billion and rebuilding of th e levee systems to handle category 5 storms was estimated at $30 billion and would take up to five years (Drew, 2006).More than the hurricane itself that was inevitable, the decision-making structure was extremely flawed. FEMA was unprepared to handle the situation and differences between the state and city officials aggravated the situation. This obviously had huge effects on the unavowed sector especially in New Orleans were everyone found themselves as victims and evacuees. Damage to the city was unprecedented and extensive and resident population declined drastically. The private sector except tourism was inevitably affected by the disaster.Some of the most important lessons include the fact that the levee system must be reexamined to become more effective in its function of preventing flooding inside the city. Decision-making must become more efficient and coordinated among city, state and federal officials to provide lovesome response to any disaster. It was a disaster made by both natural and man-made causes. It is jussive mood that the man-made part be solved before the next big hurricane hits the city. BibliographyDrew, Christopher. Hurricane Katrina Disaster. Microsoft Encarta 2007 DVD. Redmond, WA Microsoft Corporation, 2006. Haas, Edward. New Orleans. Microsoft Encarta 2007 DVD. Redmond, WA Microsoft Corporation, 2006. Katrina Timeline (n. d. ) Retrieved 7 June 2007 from http//thinkprogress. org/katrina-timeline. McQuaid, J. and M. Schleifstein. (2002). Special Report Washing Away. Retrieved 7 June 2007 from http//www. nola. com/hurricane/indexQS. ssf? /washingaway/index. html.